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SUMMARY 
Reliability is defined as the ability of a device or a system to perform its intended 
function over a specified time period under specified environmental operating 
conditions.  
An outage event involving two or more components, or two or more units based on 
IEEE standards is named as multiple outage event. In the same way a multiple outage 
event in which one outage occurrence is the consequence of another outage 
occurrence, or in which multiple outage occurrences were initiated by a single 
incident, or both is named related multiple outage event. Each outage occurrence in a 
related multiple outage event is classified as either a primary outage or a secondary 
outage depending on the relationship between that outage occurrence and its 
initiating incident. Primary outage is an outage occurrence within a related multiple 
outage event which occurs as a direct consequence of the initiating incident and is 
not dependent on any other outage occurrence. Secondary outage is an outage 
occurrence which is the result of another outage occurrence.  
Cascading failures are processes in which initial outages of electrical power system 
can propogate to more outages and cause large blackouts. 
This study presents cascading outage propagation phenomena for the Thrace part of 
Turkish National Power Transmission System. This part includes more than 120 154 
kV and 380 kV power transmission lines/cables and more than 100 transformers 
(power transformers and autotransformers). We used 7-year transmission line 
outages data of the region collected during 2000-2006 period. The average value of 
propagation of the line outages is calculated from the network data. The distribution 
of the total number of line outages is predicted from the propagation and the initial 
outages using a Galton–Watson branching process model of cascading failures. 
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ELEKTRĠK SĠSTEMLERĠNDE BAĞIMLI HATA VE ARIZA YAYILMASI 
 
ÖZET 
 
Enerji, ekonomik ve sosyal kalkınma için önemli bir kriterdir. Özellikle 1970 
yılından bu yana, tüm dünyada daha fazla önem kazanmıştır. Buna göre, enerji 
yönetimi ve planlama özellikle kuralsız enerji piyasaları var olan ve gelişmekte olan 
ülkelerde daha önemli hale gelmiştir. 
 Elektrik enerjisi tedarikçilerinin temel amacı; tüketicilere güvenilir ve tabii ki de 
ekonomik enerji sağlamaktır. Güvenilirlik; genel anlamda özel çevre ve çalışma 
koşulları altında, belirli bir süre içerisinde bir cihazın ya da bir sistemin amaçlanan 
işlevlerini gerçekleştirmek için yeteneği olarak tanımlanır. Bu tanım, ayrıca şu 
şekilde ifade edilebilir; güvenilirlik bir parça veya sistemin amaçlanan çalışma 
koşulları altında, amaçlanan gelecek dönem için işlevini doğru bir şekilde yerine 
getirebilmenin olasılığıdır. Güç sistemi tasarımında önemli faktörlerden biri de 
ekonomik faktördür. Bu yüzden açıktır ki, bu ekonomik ve güvenilirlik kısıtlamalar 
rekabet edebilirler. 
Bileşen veya birimlerin iki farklı durumları vardır. Bunlar “in service” yada “kesinti 
durumu” olarak tanımlanır. Bileşen veya ünite enerjilendirildiğinde veya tam sisteme 
bağlandığında, “in service” durumu olarak adlandırılır. Diğer taraftan, bileşen veya 
birim kısmen veya tamamen izole olduğunda ve “in service” durumunda değil ise, 
hata durumu diye adlandırılır.  
Kesinti tanımları ve endeksleri; sistem planlama modelleri, işletme ve bakım 
planlama ve de sistem tasarımına yönelik olarak kullanılmaktadır. Güvenilirlik 
hesaplamaları için gerekli olan iki bileşen verilerinin temel tipi, sistem kesintisi 
oranları ve kesinti süreleri ve kaç defa  anahtarlama yapıldığıdır. Ağ güvenilirliği 
tahmin etmek için kullanılan tüm yöntemlerin temel amacı, bu kesinti oranları ve 
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kesinti süreleri gibi bileşen parametreleri kullanarak sistem güvenilirliğini 
hesaplamakdır. 
IEEE standartlarına göre, iki veya daha fazla bileşen, ya da iki veya daha fazla birim 
içeren bir kesinti durumunda, “çoklu kesinti olayı” olarak adlandırılır.  
Aynı şekilde bir çoklu kesinti durumunda, bir kesinti başka bir kesinti oluşumu 
sonucu meydana geldiğinde ya da birden çok kesinti oluşumları, tek bir olay 
tarafından başlatılan ya da her iki durumda “related multiple outage” olarak 
adlandırılır. “Related multiple outage” durumunda her kesinti meydana birincil 
kesinti veya ikincil bir kesintisi olarak, kesinti oluşumu ve başlatan olay arasındaki 
ilişkiye bağlı olarak sınıflandırılmaktadır. Bir “related multiple outage” olayı içinde 
birincil kesintisi, kesintiyi başlatan olayın doğrudan bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkar ve 
meydana gelen diğer kesintilere bağımlı değildir. İkincil kesinti ise başka bir 
kesintinin meydana gelmesinin sonucu ortaya çıkan bir kesinti olayıdır. 
Arıza yayılması, elektrik iletim şebekesinde ilk hatanın daha yaygın kesintilere 
yayılmasından ve büyük elektrik kesintilerine neden olabilecek bir süreçtir. Büyük 
ölçeklı enerji ağlarında cascading hatası nadir bir olay olsa bile yine de toplum ve 
ulusal güvenlik için bir risk sayılır. “Cascading hataları” normalde “single line” 
kesintileri gibi bireysel hataların kombinasyonundan meydana geldiği için ve bu 
kombinasyonlarla ilgili tahmin yürütmenin zor olduğu görüldüğü için günümüzdeki 
araştırmaların önemli miktarı, bileşik şartların bir şebekeyi nasıl kararsız bir duruma 
yöneltebildiği sürecini takip etmektedir. 
Son araştırmalar, koruma sisteminin sadece olası ilk olaylarda değil hataların 
yayınlanmasında da önemli bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Empedans koruma 
röleleri, yüksek gerilim iletim hatlarında en çok kullanılan koruyucu cihazlardır. Ne 
yazık ki; “cascading arızaları” süresinde gereksiz yere “over trip” yapabilirler. Bir 
başlangıç olayı veya olaylarının reaksiyon serisinin kesin modellemeye ihtiyacı 
olduğu için, “cascading kesintisinin” risk değerlendirmesi son derece karmaşıktır. 
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Bu çalışmada kullandığımız yöntem dallanma sürecidir. Dallanma sürecinden daha 
iyi bir kavram elde etmek için, aynı tür nesnelerin yeni nesiller oluşturabildiğini 
varsayalım; bu nesneler insan, bakteri ve benzeri gibi olabilirler. Tanımlanan 
nesnelerin başlangıç seti, “sıfırıncı nesil” olarak adlandırıldığında ve bu nesil çocuk 
sahibi olduğunda “birinci nesil” elde edilir.  Birinci nesilin çocukları ise ikinci nesil 
olarak adlandırılmakta ve bu şekilde devam etmektedir. Unutmayalım ki; bu süreç 
doğrudan şans olaylarından etkilenmektedir. Her nesil bağımsız ve rasgele sayıda 
yeni nesiller doğurmaktadır. Dallanma süreçleri, çeşitli uygulamaların “cascading” 
modellemesinde kullanılmakta fakat “cascading arıza riski uygulaması” için yeni bir 
yöntem sayılmaktadır. 
Bu çalışma, Türkiye Elektrik İletim A.Ş (TEİAŞ), Trakya bölgesi için “cascading” 
arızalarının yayılma süreçlerini sunmaktadır. Bu bölge 120'den fazla 154 KV ve 380 
KV enerji nakil hatları ve kabloları ve de 100'den fazla transformatörler (güç 
transformatörleri ve ototransformatörler) içermektedir. TEİAŞ datalarına göre, 
Trakya bölgesi Türkiye`nin en çok enerji tüketen bölgesidir. TEİAŞ‟ın geçmiş 
kayıtlarına göre Trakya bölgesindeki kesintilerin sayısı, sistemin diğer bölgelerinden 
ve aynı zamanda beklentilerinden çok üstündedir. 
 Biz bu çalışmada; 2000-2006 döneminde toplanan bölgenin 7 yıllık iletim hattı 
kesintilerinin verilerini kullandık. Hat kesintisi yayılımının ortalama değerini ise ağ 
verilerinden hesapladık. Hat kesintilerinin toplam sayısının dağılımı; yayılma, ilk 
kesintiler ve “cascading hataları modeli” için kullanılan “Galton-Watson” dallanma 
süreci kullanılarak tahmin edilmektedir. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Technology plays an important role in daily life nowadays. It evolves rapidly and the 
resulting products become irreplaceable in our daily lives. One of the main inputs of 
the technology without any doubt is the energy, which is generated by a wide variety 
of recources. 
Energy, which is the criterion for economical and social development, has gained 
more importance all around the world, especially since the 1970‟s. Accordingly, 
energy management and planning has become more essential in developing 
countries, especially in the ones who have deregulated energy markets. 
The main goal of the electrical energy suppliers is to provide reliable and of course 
economical energy to the consumers. Reliability is defined as the ability of a system 
to perform its intended function over a specified time period and specified 
environmental conditions [1]. The need for probabilistic evaluation of system 
behavior has been recognized since at the 1930s [1]. Words like “reliability” and 
“effectiveness” first used in the 1938 paper by Deam [2].  
One of the vital factors in power system design is economical factor. It is evident 
therefore that the economic and reliability constraints can be competitive [3]. 
Valid and helpful knowledge are costly to gather, however it ought to be recognized 
within the long-term that it will be even costly not to collect them [1,4]. The outage 
definitions and indices are intended to use in system planning models, operations and 
maintenance planning, and system design [6]. Two basic types of component data are 
required for the calculation of system reliability; namely, outage rates and outage 
durations or switching times [7]. The main goal of all methods used to estimate the 
network reliability is to calculate system reliability using component parameteres 
such as outage rates and outage durations [7].  
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It is clear that a single circuit fault (outage) occurrence should result no loss of 
supply from the transmission system [8]. Cascading failure is a process in which 
initial failure in electric power transmission network may propagate to more 
widespread outages and cause large blackouts. In a real power system, a significant 
amount of load shedding caused by dynamic instabilities and voltage collapse due to 
lack of reactive power are the main reasons leading to cascading tripping of a series 
of system components [9]. Cascading failures caused difficult to predict combination 
of individual events, such as single line outages [10]. Since cascading failures are 
normally caused by combination of individual events like single line outages and as 
it is difficult to predict these combinations, recently, considerable amount of 
researches has tackled the problem of identifying compound contingencies that could 
place a grid in an unstable condition [10]. 
Recent researches shows that the power protection system plays a major role not only 
in any possible initial events, but in further propagation of failures [11]. Impedance 
protective relays are the most widely used protective devices in high voltage 
transmission lines. Unfortunately, they may unnecessarily over trip while cascading 
failure occures [12]. The risk assessment of cascading outage is extremly 
complicated as it needs exact modeling of a reaction series to an initiating event or 
events [13]. 
To have a better concept of branching process, let‟s imagine objects that can generate 
new objects of the same kind; these objects can be men or bacteria reproducing by 
familiar biological methods, or neutrons in a chain reaction. An initial set of the 
described objects which we name to be 0-th generation, have children which are 
named to be the first generation; their children are the second generation, and so on. 
Do not forget that the process is directly affected by chance events [14]. Branching 
processes have been used in several applications to model the cascading processes, 
but their application to the risk of cascading failure is new [15-17]. 
This study presents cascading outage propagation phenomena for the Thrace part of 
Turkish National Power Transmission System. We used 7-year transmission line 
outage data of the region collected during 2000-2006 period [19]. The average value 
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of propagation of the line outages is calculated from the outage and network data. 
The distribution of the total number of line outages is predicted from the propagation 
and the initial outages using a Galton-Watson branching process model of cascading 
failures. 
In chapter 2 we will review the reliability, reliability indices and system reliability 
calculations. In chapter 3, we will give a brief description of cascading failures. In 
chapter 4, we will overview the branching processes and Borel-Tanner distribution 
function. Finally in chapter 5, we will show the analysis for the sample system and in 
chapter 6 we will terminate the study with the conclusions derived from the study. 
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2.  RELIABILITY  
2.1 Reliability History  
Electric power systems are expected to supply the electrical energy needs of the 
customers as economic as possible and as reliable as possible regardless of the size 
of the customer [1]. Reliability is defined as the ability of a system to perform its 
intended function over a specified time period and specified environmental 
conditions. The definition can also be stated as: reliability is the probability of a 
component or a system performing its function adequately, for the future period of 
time intended, under the operating conditions intended. 
The need for probabilistic evaluation of system behavior has been recognized at 
1930s. It could be questioned that why these methods have not been used before this 
date. The main reasons were lack of data, limitations of computational resources, 
lack of realistic techniques, aversion to use the probabilistic techniques and a 
misunderstanding of the significance and the meaning of probabilistic criteria and 
indices. None of these reasons are valid nowadays as most utilities have their related 
database for reliability analysis, computing facilities are greatly enhanced, evaluation 
techniques are highly developed and most of the engineers are aware of the 
importance of probabilistic techniques. Consequently, there is no need to artificially 
constrain the inherent probabilistic nature of a power system into a deterministic 
framework. The common concept behind all probabilistic techniques developed in 
power system engineering and of course in reliability engineering is to recognise that 
all input, output and also events in the system are probabilistic variables [1]. 
Observe the use of such words as “reliability” and “effectiveness” in the 1938 paper 
by Deam: 
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“One of the difficult problems faced by those responsible for planning of electric 
supply systems is that of deciding how far they are justified in increasing the 
investment on their properties to improve service reliability. While this problem is 
not at all new in the industry, it has nevertheless taken on greatly increased 
significance in the past few years” [2]. 
Based on the needs and applications in each specific field, definitions like reliability, 
availability, adequacy, dependability and security were specified. The application of 
these definitions has evolved over many decades, and therefore the usage of some of 
the terms is unique to the area of power system applications only [2]. 
Modern society based on its pattern of social, working and also living habits has 
come to expect the supply to be continously available on demand. This expectation is 
not physically possible in real life due to random system failures which power 
system engineers can not control them. The probability of customers being 
disconnected from electric network can be reduced by more investment during the 
planning phase, operating phase or both. Preventive maintenance of ageing systems 
is a vital tool to reduce system unavailability and costs resultant by outages. On the 
other hand, maintenance actions such as inspections, repairs, replacements etc. bring 
some additional costs and often increase the unavailability of service [3]. Over-
investment can lead to excessive operating costs which must be reflected in the tariff 
structure. Consequently, the economic constraint will become desecrated though the 
system could also be very reliable. On the other hand, under-investment leads to the 
opposite situation. It is evident therefore that the economic and reliability constraints 
can be competitive, and this can lead to difficult managerial decisions at both the 
planning and operating phases. 
Finding the optimum maintenance policy is seen as coming up with the correct 
schedule and proper depth of maintenance with the target to maximize the 
responsibility of the system whereas minimizing the whole price of outages and 
maintenance actions [3]. 
These issues have continuously been widely known and understood and it is not 
suggested that they need solely recently return to the fore. Design, planning and 
7 
operative criteria and techniques are developed over several decades in an effort to 
resolve and satisfy the quandary between the economic, operational and reliability 
constraints [1]. 
The development of reliability analysis techniques was at the start related to the 
aerospace industry and military applications. These developments were followed 
quickly by applications within the nuclear industry. All of those areas have suffered 
from severe failures in the past. These include aerospace (Challenger space shuttle, 
1986; several commercial aircraft accidents annually), nuclear (Three Mile Island, 
1979; Chernobyl, 1986) [4], electricity supply (North America, 14 August 2003; 
Europe, 12 November 2006; Brazil, 10 November 2009) [5], and many similar 
events in which severe social and environmental consequences and many deaths have 
been happened. These events have considerably increased the pressure to objectively 
assess reliability, safety and overall probabilistic risk [4]. 
2.2 Reliability Data 
Data processing comprises two activities: 
- Field data collection by operations and maintenance (O&M) personnel 
documenting the details of all failures as they happen, together with the associated 
outage duration; 
- Analysis of these data to create probabilistic indices, which will be subsequently 
updated by the access of new data [4]. 
2.2.1 Data importance in reliability calculations 
Any discussion of quantitative reliability analysis invariably results in a discussion of 
the existence and accessibility of the data needed to support such studies. Valid and 
helpful knowledge are costly to gather, however it ought to be recognized within the 
long-term that it will be even costlier not to collect them. It is sometimes argued as 
“which comes first: reliability data or reliability methodology”. Some networks do 
not collect data because they do not have fully determined a suitable reliability 
methodology. Conversely, they do not conduct reliability studies because they do not 
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have any data. It ought to be remembered that data assortment and reliability analysis 
should evolve along, and thus the method is repetitive. The point at which to stop on 
either should be based on the economic use to be made of the tools, techniques and 
data [1,4]. 
The quality of the statistical indices depends on how the data processed, how much 
pooling is done and how old the stored data are, since these factors affect the 
relevance of the reliability indices for their future use [1,4]. The quality of the data 
and thus the confidence that can be placed in it, is directly depend on the accuracy 
and completeness of the information compiled by O&M personnel. It is thus essential 
that they must be made very attentively for the longer-term use and also the 
importance that it will play within the latter developments of the system [1]. 
It is evident that the best data are one‟s own data since all related attributes should be 
known [4]. If these are unavailable, it may be necessary to use generic data collected 
and analyzed by other organizations. The confidence associated with these data will 
be lower than the data collected from the one‟s own utility. In the absence of 
comprehensive and complete data, it is helpful for an individual utility to gain some 
consistent criterion using expertise or judgment by which they will then assess the 
good thing about enlargement and reinforcement schemes [1]. 
2.2.2 Reliability data collection 
One of the main problems relating to data is associated with obtaining the data [4]. 
At data collection stage, it ought to be remembered that a limitless quantity of data 
may be collected. It is inefficient and undesirable to gather, analyze and store 
additional data than is needed for the aim supposed. Therefore, it is essential to spot 
how the data are going to be used before deciding to gather what kind of data.  
Data can be established in one of two ways: from experimental testing or from 
operational field data. The first is only applicable for small-scale components, which 
can be tested in sufficient quantities without creating excessive costs. This clearly is 
an ideal method since data on relevant components are established before they are 
used in real systems. The second method has to be used for all other situations. These 
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data are then used in subsequent design reviews, creating a feedback loop and a 
reliability growth concept [4]. 
Data may be stored in a data bank for later use. In conceptual terms, data can be 
collected for one or both of two reasons; to assess the past performance whenever 
needed and/ or to predict the future performance of the system. The past assessment 
looks back at the past behavior of the system whereas the predictive procedure looks 
forward at system future behavior. Altogether, it is needed to transform past 
experience data into the required future prediction. Collection of data is therefore 
vital as it forms the input to suitable reliability models, techniques and equations [1]. 
It should also be remembered that the data requirements should reflect the needs of 
the predictive methodology. This means that the data must be sufficiently general to 
ensure that the methods can be applied and also restrictive enough to ensure that 
unnecessary data is neither collected nor irrelevant statistics evaluated. Thus, the data 
ought to replicate and reply to the factors that have an effect on system reliability and 
enable it to be sculptural and analyzed. This implies that it ought to relate to the two 
main processes involved in network component behavior, namely the failure process 
and the restoration process. It cannot be stressed too strongly that, in making a 
decision to which data to be collected, a utility must make its decision on basis of the 
factors that have an impact on its own planning and design considerations [1]. 
To define reliability terminology and basic data requirements first we have to 
classified equipments and reliability indices. 
2.3 Equipment Classification 
Equipments are divided into four different groups with respect to their functions: 
components, subcomponents, units and terminals. 
Component is a device which performs a major operating function and which is 
regarded as an entity for purposes of recording and analyzing data on outage 
occurrences. Some examples of power system components are line sections, 
transformers, ac/dc converters, series capacitors or reactors, shunt capacitors or 
reactors, circuit breakers, line protection systems and bus sections [6]. 
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Subcomponent is a part or a portion of a component, which is relevant for 
quantifying exposure to outage occurrences, or failures, or both or for identifying the 
cause of an outage occurrence or failure [6]. An example for subcomponent is a line 
segment, which is a portion of a line section that has a particular type of construction 
or is exposed to a particular type of failure, and therefore which may be regarded as a 
single entity for the purpose of reporting and analyzing failure and exposure data. 
Unit is a group of components, which are functionally related and are regarded as an 
entity for purposes of recording and analyzing data on outage occurrences [6]. 
A unit can be defined in a number of different ways. For example, it may be a group 
of components, which constitute an operating entity bounded by automatic fault 
interrupting devices which isolate it from other such entities for faults on any 
component within the group or a group of components protected by and within the 
sensing zone of a particular system of protective relays for example a transformer or 
an overhead line and associated terminal facilities switched with it. A unit also can 
be a group of components including a transmission line, one or more transformers 
supplied by the line, and a sub-transmission or distribution network radially supplied 
from the transformer. These components are so configured that the sub-transmission 
network is in the outage state during outage occurrences of the transmission line [6]. 
A unit may be single-terminal, two-terminal or multiterminal. A multi-terminal unit 
is connected to three or more terminals. It is recognized that certain components (for 
example, circuit breakers) may be part of more than one unit. Different types of units 
include transmission unit (no different overhead line or cable), transformer unit, bus 
unit, and special units that consist of any equipment protected by separate breakers, 
such as shunt capacitors [6]. 
Terminal is a functional facility (substation, generating station, or load center) which 
includes components such as bus sections, circuit breakers, and protection systems 
where transmission units terminate [6]. 
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2.4 Reliability Indices 
Component or unit state is a particular condition or status of a component or a unit, 
which is important for outage reporting proposes [6]. Component or unit has two 
different states; in-service state or outage state. 
When the component or unit is energized and fully connected to the system, it is 
called in-service state; on the other hand if the component or unit is partially or fully 
isolated from the system and not in-service state it is called outage state [6]. If the 
component or unit is completely de-energized or is connected but it is not serving 
any of its functions within the power system, the component or unit is in complete 
outage state. If the component or unit is at least partially energized, or is not fully 
connected to all of its terminals, or both, so that it is not serving some of its functions 
within the power system, then the component or unit is in partial outage state [6]. 
 
2.4.1 Changes in state and outage types 
An event involving the outage occurrence of one or more units or components called 
outage event. An outage event involving only one component or one unit is single 
outage event. An outage event involving two or more components or two or more 
units is called multiple outage events. A multiple outage event in which one outage 
occurrence is the consequence of another outage occurrence, or in which multiple 
outage occurrences were initiated by a single incident, or both is called related 
multiple outage events. Each outage occurrence in a related multiple outage event is 
classified as either a primary outage or a secondary outage depending on the 
relationship between that outage occurrence and its initiating incident. 
An outage occurrence within a related multiple outage event which occurs as a direct 
consequence of the initiating incident and is not dependent on any other outage 
occurrence is the primary outage in the related multiple outage event. A primary 
outage of a component or a unit may be caused by a fault on equipment within the 
unit or component or repair of a component within the unit. An outage occurrence 
which is the result of another outage occurrence will be the secondary outage [6]. 
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2.4.2 System reliability calculation 
Statistics is the traditional science used to assess the reliability [4]. Two basic types 
of component data are required for the calculation of system reliability; namely, 
outage rates and outage durations or switching times. The perfect data required for a 
specific reliability study depend on the nature and the scope of that study [7]. 
2.4.3 Rate indices 
Outage rates are divided into two different categories; namely, forced outage rates 
(FOR) and scheduled outage rates. According to IEEE standard, outage rates are 
obtained by dividing the number of outage occurrences to the service time [6]. The 
unit of service time in power system reliability calculations usually is one year [6]. 
Outage rates can be sub-divided by outage types, by the weather prevailing during 
the service time, or by season. 
Forced outages are automatic outages or manual outages that cannot be deferred [6]. 
As examples of forced outage rates, we can consider persistent-cause forced outage 
rates and transient-cause forced outage rates. Persistent-cause forced outage is an 
outage that results from emergency conditions directly associated with a component 
requiring then it should be taken out of service immediately. A persistent-cause 
forced outage is a forced outage, which requires the affected component to be 
repaired or replaced before it could be re energized. If the studied system is a 
paralleled system and if the effect of the storms is to be considered, persistent-cause 
forced outage rates should be obtained separately for normal and stormy weather. 
The units of the outage rates are outage per component per calendar year or per year 
of stormy or normal weather if the effect of storms is to be evaluated [7]. In the other 
hand, a transient-cause forced outage is a component outage whose cause is 
temporary such that the affected part can be restored to service by a reclosing 
operation or by a fuse replaced. A lightning flashover, which could be cleared by a 
reclosing operation, is an example of a transient-cause forced outage. Because of the 
short time duration of most transient-cause forced outages, it seems not to be 
necessary to separate them into normal and stormy weather catagories. Then the unit 
of this kind of outage rates is outage per component per service time [7]. 
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A scheduled outage is an outage that results when a component is deliberately taken 
out of service at a selected time for purposes of construction, maintenance, repair or 
other work directly associated with or attributable to the component [7]. A manual 
outage is classified as scheduled if it is possible to defer the outage occurrence 
without increasing the risk to human life, risk to property or damage to equipment 
when such a deferment is desirable [6]. Deferring an outage occurrence may be 
desirable, for example, to prevent overload of facilities or an interruption of service 
to consumers [6]. The units of the scheduled outage rates are outage per component 
per service time (calendar year) [7]. 
Failure rate and protective system false operation rate are other examples of rates. 
The inability of a component to perform its required function named failure. Failure 
rate is obtained by number of failures of a particular type divided by exposure time. 
It should be remembered that failure rates could be computed for a specific 
component, a class of components or units, or per unit of length in the case of lines, 
common structure, or common right-of-way exposure [6]. Protective system false 
operation rate can be established by dividing number of false operations to exposure 
time [6]. 
2.4.4 Duration indices and statements 
There are different duration indices like mean time to outage or mean outage 
duration; but first we have to explain some definitions like service time, outage time 
etc. to have a better view about concept of these indices. The accumulated time one 
or more components or units are in the in-service state during the reporting period is 
called service time [6]. The accumulated time when one or more components or units 
are in the outage state during the reporting periods called outage time and also we 
know that reporting period time equals service time plus outage time [6]. Outage 
duration is the period from the initiation of an outage occurrence until the component 
or unit is returned to the in-service state [6]. It is better to consider that outage 
duration is normally equal to the sum of switching time, repair time, and travel and 
material procurement time, but may be longer for reasons other than unavailability of 
manpower, equipment, or material [6]. 
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The mean time to outage occurrences of a specified type is equal to service time 
divided by number of outage occurrence of that specified type. In a same way, the 
mean duration of outage occurrence of a specified type equals to outage time due to 
outages of a specified type divided by number of outage occurrences of a specified 
type [6]. Mean outage duration is also referred to as mean time to restoration [6]. 
Persistent-cause forced outage duration is the period of time from the initiation of an 
outage until the affected component is repaired or replaced and made available to 
perform its intended function. Outage duration distribution may usually be 
satisfactorily represented by mean outage duration. For calculation purposes the units 
of mean outage durations should be in year [7]. Transient-cause forced outage 
duration is the period of time from the initiation of an outage until the affected 
component is restored to service by a reclosing or refusing operation. Therefore, 
transient-cause forced outage duration is a switching or re-fusing time in fact [7]. 
Scheduled outage duration is the period of time from the initiation of a scheduled 
outage until the component is restored to service. Outage duration distributions may 
usually be satisfactorily represented by mean outage durations. This duration, like 
persistent-cause forced outage duration, for calculation purposes should have the 
units of year [7].  
Switching or re-fusing time is the period from the time the operation is required due 
to a forced outage until the operation is completed. Switching times should, in 
general, include only manual switching times at non-attended locations. Automatic 
switching times or manual switching times at attended locations can usually be 
regarded as zero for purposes of system reliability calculations. Manual switching 
and re-fusing time distributions may usually be satisfactorily represented by mean 
times. Again, units should be in years for calculation purposes [7]. 
However, nowadays many other indices are regularly calculated, the most 
appropriate being dependent on the system and its requirements. It is therefore not 
reasonable to be prescriptive. Instead, all related indices are now generally termed 
reliability indices and in consequence, the term reliability itself is frequently used as 
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a generic term describing all these indices instead of being only associated with the 
probability term [4]. 
2.4.5 Estimation of outage rates and errors  
First of all, it will be usefull to remind that probability theory is the only tool for 
system engineers which can enable them to transform system knowledge into a 
prediction of systems future behavior. After exactly obtaining this concept, a model 
can be derived and the most appropriate evaluation technique can be chosen [4]. 
To estimate the future outage rate, first step is grouping the lines. This grouping can 
be based on the voltage level, line structure like shielding, types etc. Second step is 
plotting the number of outages of a given group of lines for each year per unit length 
of exposure. It is very important to plot outage number of the lines which, length of 
exposure not changed during a year and also all data for the whole year are available 
and also trustworthy. It is not accurate to use outage data of a part of a year and to 
estimate number of failures of a whole year. It is because the frequency of occurring 
failures over a year is not uniform and also the number of outages suffered by a line 
is not necessarily directly proportional to the length of exposure [7]. 
The next step in data analysis after collecting the data for outage per year vs. line 
exposure, is determining a mathematical relationship between line exposure and the 
number of outages per year. Regression analysis can be used in this step [7]. 
Estimating future outage rates of transmission lines using scatter diagram-regression 
analysis has advantages like follows: 
Scatter diagram of line outages per year vs. line exposure will give us a view to 
check homogeneity in a homogenous group and after this checking, line which do 
not act in the same way as the other lines in the group act could be decided to be 
eliminated or not. Another advantage and also much more important one, the 
regression method provides a mean for making confidence statements about the line 
outage rates [7]. It is better not to forget that the outage rate resultant from regression 
line may be regarded as an estimate of the outage rate in an individual future year or 
an estimate of the future mean annual outage rate [7]. 
16 
  
17 
3.  CASCADING FAILURES 
3.1 Introduction 
Cascading failure is a process in which initial failure(s) in electric power 
transmission network components may propagate to more widespread outages and 
cause large blackouts. The initial outages which are already occurred weaken the 
network and make failure propagation more probable. 
Most of the initial failures are because of component reliability and/or external 
stresses such as weather; while the propagation of outages is more because of overall 
system resilience. So to mitigate cascading outages, it is necessary either to limit 
initial failures or the propagation. 
The most common rule for reliability is known as N-1 criteria. It means that power 
system should be able to supply demand even if an unplanned outage occur for any 
of power network components (transmission lines, underground cables, transformers, 
autotransformers, generating units and also reactive compensation components) 
without violating branch thermal limits, nodal voltage limits or whole system 
stability limits [8]. It is clear that a single circuit fault outage should result no loss of 
supply from the transmission system. Of course a limited amount of loss of supply is 
allowed in a fault outage of a double circuit or a single section of a busbar [8]. Power 
systems always work under a risk of great disturbances, which may lead to blackouts 
in a large-scale. Network interconnection could increase the system operating 
efficiency, and obtain a greater economic income. But it also may lead to the 
increase in the operational uncertainty, interconnecting also makes the system 
dynamic behaviour more complicated, and expanding the impact of local power grid 
failure into nearby region electrical network, which is more likely to lead to 
blackouts caused by cascading failures [9]. 
A cascading outage is a sequence of events in which an initial failure, or set of 
failures, lead to a sequence of one or more dependent component outages. In some 
cases cascading outages stop before the sequence results in the interruption of 
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electricity service in a region. Anyhow in many notable cases, such as blackouts in 
North America on 14 August 2003, Europe on 12 November 2006, and Brazil on 10 
November 2009, cascading outages have resulted in huge disruptions to electricity 
service. Although such large blackouts are infrequent, they contribute significantly to 
blackout risk and perceptions of whole electricity service reliability [5]. 
The cascading outage is influenced by the details of the system state, such as 
components scheduled outages and the patterns of power transfers, and the automatic 
and manual system procedures. The initiating events for a cascading outage can 
include a wide variety of exogenous disturbances such as high speed winds, 
lightning, natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.), contact between 
conductors and vegetation or human error. Moreover, there are many mechanisms by 
which subsequent outages can propagate beyond the initial outages. Generally the 
dependent component outages occur when relays or humans trip circuit breakers [5]. 
In a real power system, a significant amount of load shedding caused by dynamic 
instabilities and voltage collapse due to lack of reactive power are the main reasons 
leading to cascading tripping of a series of electrical components (generators or 
branches), which may cause the catastrophic events in system. Catastrophic event 
sequence, also called collapse sequence (CS), to define this sequence we have to say  
a series of element disturbence sequences during the system transition from normal 
operating state to catastrophic event state [9]. 
Cascading failures of large-scale power grids are rare events that nevertheless pose a 
grave and likely growing risk to society and also to national security [10]. Cascading 
failures caused by subtle & difficult to predict combination of individual events such 
as single line outages [10]. 
Because cascading failures normally caused by combination of individual events like 
single line outages and as it is difficult to predict these combinations, recently, 
considerable amount of researches has tackled the problem of identifying compound 
contingencies (such as the outage of a few lines in a series) that could place a grid in 
an unstable condition. This problem is known as „N-k problem‟ where k integer 
express the number of simultaneous indivitual events happened in the system. It is 
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naturally a combinatorial problem, which, for the large size of national power system 
grids, is quite challenging [10]. 
3.2 Effect of Relays In Cascading Failures 
Recent researches show that the power protection system plays a major role not only 
in any possible initial events, but in further propagation of failures. North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) studies have also shown that the interval of 
major disturbances are long and that 70% of disturbances involved the relay system 
faults, not necessarily as the initial event, but contributing to the cascading failure 
effect of power transmission system [11].  
Over- and under-voltage relays protect most generators while under-voltage relays 
protect large-capacity load motors and some particular equipments. While in general 
these relays operate as intended, their operations will reduce the angular and voltage 
stability margins of the system in the course of a sequence of cascading failures  
[12]. 
Impedance protective relays are the most extensively used protective devices in high 
voltage transmission lines. Generally, the relays operate when the impedance 
measured by the relays falls within the relays setting range. Unfortunately, they may 
unnecessarily over trip while cascading failure occur, due for example to voltage 
sags caused by line overloads. The latter make the measured impedance by a relay 
smaller than its setting, simulating a nearby fault on the system. Note that among 
impedance relays, zone 3 relays are the most sensitive to voltage dip due to its large 
setting range [12]. 
Most of the incorrect operations display that the relay had an undetected fault that 
was not observed until abnormal operations occurred, which is often named as a 
hidden failure [11]. Hidden failure refers to permanent defects that would cause a 
relay or a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately react to disturbances. The 
hidden failures in power system are usually triggered by other events, and not 
frequently occur, but they may have disastrous consequences [13]. 
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3.3 Tools For Risk Assessment of Cascading Outages 
 The risk assessment of cascading outage is extremly complicated as it needs exact 
modeling of a reactions series to an initiating event or events. Considerable efforts 
have been devoted to develop risk-based tools able to take into account cascading 
failures. Because of the very huge number of possible events combinations that may 
lead to a  cascading failure, many of these tools adopt a probabilistic approach. Here 
we will review both the deterministic and the risk-based or probabilistic cascading 
tools used in power system planning and operation. Then we will describe some of 
commercially available tools as well as research purpose tools. The available 
computer programs show considerable differences in many factors, such as load 
relief, modeling of protection failures, modeling of operating policies, calculated risk 
indices, etc. A brief summary of commercial and research grade tools used in 
cascading failure events and their consequences is shown in Table 3.1 and also Table 
3.2 [13]. 
Table 3. 1 : Commercially Available Tools. 
Cascading Tool Methodology  power flow 
Max. number of 
buses 
Web 
address 
ACCESS 
 
Analytical + 
Monte Carlo 
DC or AC 
steady state + 
dynamic 
simulation 
Practical limit of 
around 2000 
buses 
Yes 
CAT Analytical AC 64,000 Yes 
POM-PCM Analytical 
AC steady 
state + 
dynamic 
simulation 
No limit Yes 
TRELSS Analytical AC or DC 13,000 No 
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Table 3. 2 : Research-Grade Tools. 
Cascading Tool Methodology Power Flow 
Max. number of 
buses 
Web 
address 
HIDDEN 
FAILURE, USA 
Monte Carlo AC 300 No 
MANCHESTER 
by The University 
of Manchester, 
UK 
Monte Carlo AC 1,500 No 
OPA 
by ORNL-
PSERC-Alaska, 
USA 
Monte Carlo, 
complex 
system 
DC 1000 No 
PSA 
by Los Alamos 
National 
Laboratory, USA 
Monte Carlo AC or DC 64,000 No 
TAM 
by Texas A&M 
University, USA 
Monte Carlo AC 24 No 
 Now we will describe the tools listed in table 3.1 and table 3.2. 
 ACCESS is a commercial tool developed by French transmission system operator 
(RTE), in collaboration with its equivalent in England and Wales, National Grid. It 
provides a single software environment in which the user can specify, quite 
precisely, a very wide range of uncertainties, and allow their impact to be explored 
quite systematically. This is gained by means of four facilities: first of all, a security-
constrained AC optimal power flow is used to represent how an operator or the 
market would have dispatched the available power system facilities. Second, a quasi-
steady state simulation - developed between RTE and University of Liege, called 
„Astre' - that, while assuming electromechanical equilibrium of the system, models 
the action of voltage control devices in particular (and has some simple model of 
protection of branches of the network). Then, having a full time-domain simulation 
that allows modeling of many controls on the system, including field current limiters 
on generators, governors, some forms of generator protection and zone 3 protection 
on overhead lines. At last Access to a suite of statistical analysis tools that can be 
applied to detailed simulation results stored for many scenarios in a database [13]. 
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While ACCESS was designed to be applicable in many kinds of study, the possibility 
of modeling sequences of events, whether independent or consequential to the 
current state of the system in a simulation, and arying a range of system parameters 
such as protection settings, line ratings, fault clearance times, etc., provides a 
powerful means of assessing the possibility of cascading outages occurring and their 
impact. If the user can have confidence that the specified sampling laws for variation 
of different initial conditions, equipment parameters and independent fault events are 
accurate, the probability of different outcomes might also be used in decision 
making. The downside of such a flexible tool is that it requires specialist users and, 
especially if a full time domain simulation is to be carried out, considerable volumes 
of data. A study must also be carefully designed in respect of its specific aims. It 
must generally be established quite early on whether steady state or quasi steady state 
analysis will suffice, and, if uncertainties are to be assessed how to define hem so as 
to concentrate results on areas of interest [13]. 
 Second tool in this category is Cascading Analysis tool (CAT), CAT is a part of the 
TRANSMISSION 2000® suite of programs developed by Commonwealth 
Associates Inc. (CAI) and is commercially available. The CAT utilizes 
TRANSMISSION 2000 software environment to objectively evaluate the potential 
vulnerability to widespread outages and uncontrolled cascading. The CAT 
automatically runs a set of contingencies to determine the potential to initiate facility 
and/or load losses beyond the initial contingency. For each contingency, the tool 
checks the post-contingency operating state against userspecified criteria. If a 
subsequent loss is indicated, the tool automatically simulates the loss. The most 
common criteria that might be used in an analysis are: Thermal Overload Criterion, 
Low Voltage Criterion and Voltage Change Criterion [13]. 
For probable events that cause thermal overloads or low voltages, the next outage is 
specified by looking at thermal violations and identifying the worst overload (as a 
percent of rating), or, if there are no thermal violations, by dropping load with the 
lowest actual voltage at the bus. Only one facility is added to the list of outages per 
iteration. This process is repeated until there are no further criteria violations. For 
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contingencies which cause the power flow to diverge, or if any step is taken to 
relieve a violation cause‟s divergence, load is dropped at the bus associated with the 
divergence and another attempt is made to solve the case. The process repeats until 
one of the four conditions is reached: 
1. The case solves without violations 
2. The next load drop would exceed the user-specified maximum load drop 
3. A low-voltage condition is encountered, indicating that load drop is warranted, but 
there is no load in the vicinity of the voltage violation to drop, or 
4. The case interrupts 
If the case solves without violations, it means there isn't a reasonable vulnerability to 
widespread outages. Provided that the probabilities of the initiating events are known 
and these kind of events as independent, by assuming that the conditional probability 
that cascading outages cannot be precluded is 1.0, a probability or an index of 
performance can be computed by summing the probabilities of initiating events [13]. 
 The third tool in the commercially available tools is POM-PCM. Potential 
Cascading Modes (PCM) tool is a part of Physical and Operational Margins (POM) 
Suite developed by V&R Energy Systems Research, Inc. and is commercially 
available. PCM utilizes POM software environment to simultaneously monitor 
voltage stability, thermal overloads and voltage violations. Execution time for an AC 
solution for one contingency is approx. 0.1 sec for a 50000-bus case [13]. Initial 
outages probability are generated either automatically as result of the cluster 
approach or from user specified probability list [13]. 
Following an initial failure, cascading chains are automatically identified. A 
cascading chain is a series of consecutive tripping events following an initial failure 
which, are caused by overloads exceeding the branch tripping threshold, low voltage 
or high voltage violation below or above load/generator tripping thresholds. All the 
thresholds are user-defined [13]. PCM permit the user to analyze the cascading 
outages as both steady-state and transient stability phenomena. Transient stability 
approach includes frequency issues and relay operations [13]. 
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PCM has the capability to quickly identify and prevent potential cascading outages in 
near real-time, operations and planning environments [13]. 
The last commercially available tool is TRELSS. Transmission Reliability 
Evaluation of Large Scale Systems (TRELSS) is commercially available tool for 
reliability assessment of composite generation and transmission systems developed 
by Electric power Research Institute (EPRI) in cooperation with Southern Company 
Services. Cascading failure analysis in TRELSS aims to capture the cascade path 
starting from a strengthened system condition and an initial failure. The user can 
prepare a list of thousands of initiating events which TRELSS will evaluate each of 
them separately. A list of threshold values such as the loading level at which a 
transmission line trips, or the threshold low voltage at which a load is dropped, are 
set. The model simulates the cascading process as a sequence of quasi-steady state 
system conditions caused by a sequence of tripping events [13]. 
A unique feature in TRELSS is the modeling of the protection system actions to 
realistically simulate potential cascading failures. It is assumed that initiating events 
are triggered by action of a set of breakers comprising a protection zone. Since 
several bulk-power transmissions system components are protected by a set of 
breakers all of these components are taken out of service. A set of components 
protected by a common set of breakers is termed a Protection and Control Group 
(PCG). When a PCG goes out of service due to action of the breakers defining the 
PCG boundary, other components belonging to a different protection zone may also 
go out of service. In its turn, these initial outages could cause severe overloads and 
voltage deviations in transmission facilities. This may trigger further tripping action 
of other PCGs, and so on. Cascading outages can propagate through the 
interconnection incurring significant loss of load potentially leading to system 
collapse [13]. 
TRELSS includes a very fast decoupled power-flow algorithm that implements both 
partial matrix re-factorization and factor update algorithms to modify the system 
matrix during bus type switching. Auxiliary solution in the Q-V iteration aids in 
smoothing solution perturbations introduced due to bus-type switching. These 
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enhancements have resulted in extremely fast solution speed while enhancing the 
robustness of the solution-algorithm. Within each cascading failure step, generating 
units are re-dispatched through one of the following methods: unit margin, 
generating unit participation factor and full or fixed-loss economic generation 
dispatch. The linear programming module provides a mixed integer solution and 
incorporates both continuous and discrete controls. Control actions include generator 
MW and MVAR re-dispatch, transformer tap and phase shift adjustment, capacitor 
and reactor switching, three classes of load curtailment and even relaxation of area 
interchange. The remedial actions algorithm is based upon the computation of 
sensitivity of system constraints, such as overloads and voltage violations, with 
respect to system controls. The sensitivity computation is exact and utilizes the full 
Jacobean matrix. User specified remedial actions can be selected such as circuit 
switching, load transfer or load curtailment when contingencies or system problems 
occur, and the specification of both study and remedial action areas [13]. 
First research grade tool is hidden failure. The Hidden Failures (HF) is a research-
grade tool developed by Chen and Thorp. HF is based on AC load flow 
representation with primary focus on modeling of hidden failures thermal overloads 
and generator re-dispatch. Hidden failures of the protection system are modeled by 
probabilistic approaches in HF. HF uses fast simulation technique and heuristic 
random search to identify critical relays that contribute too many possible cascades. 
The availability of protection data to support simulation and the burden of processing 
it are issues [13]. 
Second tool in this catagorie is MANCHESTER. The Manchester model is a 
research-grade tool which aims to represent a range of cascading failure interactions, 
including cascading and sympathetic tripping of transmission lines, heuristic 
representation of generator instability, under frequency load shedding, post-
contingency re-dispatch of active and reactive resources, and emergency load 
shedding to prevent a complete system blackout caused by a voltage collapse. In 
addition to the standard network data needed to run an ac power flow, the input data 
consists of probabilities of failures of the generation and transmission components as 
26 
well as estimates of the probabilities of hidden failures in the protection system. Note 
that the probabilities of failures can be adjusted to take into account the effect of the 
weather conditions. One of the distinctive features of the model is that it estimates 
the time required to restore the load following an outage [13]. 
The third tool in research grade tools is named OPA. The Oak Ridge-PSERC-Alaska 
(OPA) is a tool for studying the complex dynamics of an upgrading power system 
with cascading line outages. OPA represents cascading outages and line overloads 
with a DC load flow model. Starting from a solved base case, blackouts are initiated 
by random line outages. Whenever a line is outaged, the generation and load are re-
dispatched using standard linear programming methods. The cost function is 
weighted to ensure that load shedding is avoided where is possible. If any lines were 
limited during the optimization then these lines are outaged with a fixed probability. 
The process of re-dispatch and testing for outages is iterated until there are no more 
outages. The total load shed is, then, the power lost in the blackout. The OPA model 
neglects many of the cascading processes in blackouts and the timing of events, but it 
does represent in a simplified way a dynamical process of cascading overloads and 
outages that is consistent with some basic network and operational constraints. The 
distinctive feature of the OPA simulation is that it accounts for the complex system 
dynamics of upgrade so that self-organization of an evolving power system can be 
studied. Average load slowly increases, lines involved in blackouts are upgraded, and 
generation is increased to maintain margins and coordinate with the line increases. 
The simple representation of the cascading and upgrading processes is desirable both 
to study only the main interactions governing the complex dynamics and for 
pragmatic reasons of model tractability and simulation run time. The input data for 
OPA is a DC load flow description of the network, line flow limits, and parameters 
controlling the probabilistic tripping of lines, average growth rate and upgrading of 
lines and generation. The output data describes a series of cascading blackouts as the 
power system gradually evolves, including the lines tripping and load shed in stages 
of each blackout [13]. 
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Next tool in research grade tools is PCA. The Power System Analyzer (PSA) suite of 
numerical tools was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory to permit model 
building, analysis, and graphical display of electric power transmission networks. 
With respect to PSA, a model is defined as a geographic representation of an electric 
transmission network that can be used to compute both linear and nonlinear power-
flow solutions that have been benchmarked against a filed base-case solution [13]. 
The last tool is TAM. The TAM is a research-grade program developed by Texas A 
& M University. It is a part of general model for reliability analysis developed by 
Singh and Patton with a particular capability to differentiate various protection 
failure modes. Two major failure modes in protection system: "failure to operate" 
and "undesired tripping" are the major cause of cascading outages. The former means 
that when a fault occurs in a power system, the protection system fails to clear the 
fault. The later refers to either spontaneous operation in the absence of a fault or trip 
for faults outside the protection zone. After the initial fault is cleared, power flow in 
the system would change due to the changing topology. This might lead to 
redistribution of load on certain lines, which are then risk to trip subsequently. In fact 
a more explicit model of component paired with protection system is established to 
include two types of protection failures [13]. 
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4.  BRANCHING PROCESS 
Networked structures operated under highly loaded conditions are endangered to 
harmful cascading failures. For example, electric power transmission systems must 
be designed and operated to reduce the risk of widespread blackouts caused by 
cascading failure. There is a need for analytically tractable models to understand and 
quantify the risks of cascading failure in electric power systems. We study a 
probabilistic model of loading dependent cascading failure by approximating the 
propagation of failures as a branching process [21]. 
 
Generation 4 
 
Generation 3 
 
Generation 2 
 
Generation 1 
 
Generation 0 
 
This diagram explains branching process but does not show location of outages in 
power grid. Each outage independently has random number of child outages in next 
generation. 
Figure 4. 1:Cascading generations, parents and children. 
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Let , , , ... be the respective probabilities that a man has 0, 1, 2, ... sons, and let 
each son have the same probability that the male line is extinct after r generations, 
and more generally what is the probability for any given number of descendants in 
the male line in any given generation [14]. This question is the base of the Galton-
Watson branching process. 
Let‟s imagine objects that can generate additional objects of the same kind; these 
objects can be men or bacteria reproducing by familiar biological methods, or 
neutrons in a chain reaction. An initial set of the described objects which we name 
them 0-th generation, have children which are named the first generation; their 
children are the second generation, and so on. Do not forget that the process is 
directly affected by chance events [14]. 
We give the meaning of number of objects in the n-th generation of a population or 
family to  [14]. We shal always remember that  must be equal to 1, unless the 
otherwise is stated. The appropriate adjustments if  are made as we consider 
the families of initial objects develop independently of one another [14].  
We interpret P as the probability measure for our process. The probability 
distribution of  is described by putting , , 
where  is denote as the probability that an object existing in the n-th generation has 
k children in the (n+1)-th generation [14]. 
The conditional distribution of , given , is appropriate to the assumption 
that different objects reproduce independently; that is is distributed as the sum 
of  independent random variables, each distributed like . If , then , 
has probability 1 of being 0. Thus, we have defined the transition probabilities of our 
Markov process, denoted by (4.1). 
 (4.1) 
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These transition probabilities are defined for each  and  even if, strictly speakingthe 
right side of equation written above is not defined as a conditional probability 
if . 
4.1 Generating Function 
We first consider an infinite number of system components. All components are 
initially unfailed. Component failures occur in stages with  number of failures in 
stage i. We first assume an initial disturbance that causes failure(s) in stage zero. 
This first failure is considered to cause a certain number of failures in stage 1.  
is determined according to a probability distribution with generating function . 
In subsequent stages, each of the  failures in stage i independently causes a further 
number of failures in stage i + 1 according to the same distribution f(s) [21]. 
 We shall make repeated use of the probability generating function as shown in (4.2) 
         (4.2) 
Where, s is a complex variable. 
Iterates of the generating function  will be defined by (4.3) and (4.4) [14]: 
 (4.3) 
 (4.4) 
It is obvious that each of iterates is a probability generating function, and the 
relations shown in (4.5) are a consequence of above equations [14]: 
 (4.5) 
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And as specific, shown in (4.6): 
 (4.6) 
The generationg function of is the n-th iterate . This basic result was first 
discovered by WATSON (1874) and has been discovered a number of times since 
then [14]. 
4.2 Survival of Animal Families or Genes 
We will now fix our attention on a family descended from some one member. 
Suppose that the family has an average multiplication rate of λ, which, may be 
different form 1 to some reasons [14]. 
The mathematical treatment of branching process is simple as the reproduction of an 
object is supposed to be independent of past history and also from present situation 
of other objects. Once the assumption of being independent dropped, there is no 
simple way of classifying the resulting process. They may be Markov or non Markov 
processes of quite general types [14]. 
4.3 Cascading Processes 
Branching processes have long been used in different applications to model 
cascading processes, but their applications to the risk of cascading failure is recent. 
The Galton-Watson branching process gives a probabilistic model of the number of 
failures [15]. Branching process models are an obvious choice of stochastic model to 
capture the great features of cascading blackouts, because they have been developed 
and also applied to other cascading processes like genealogy, epidemics and cosmic 
rays [16]. 
There are general arguments supporting the choice of a Poisson distribution for the 
offspring distribution [14]. The Poisson distribution is a good approximation when 
each failure propagates to a large number of components so that each parent failure 
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has a small, fairly-uniform probability of independently causing child failures in a 
large number of other components. This assumption seems reasonable for cascades 
in power systems, especially in the initial part of the cascade when there are many 
unfailed components which are stressed by the components already failed [15]. 
We assume an arbitrary distribution of nonzero initial failures  for 
. Then it is a standard result in branching process that the total number 
of outages is distributed through a mixture of Borel-Tanner distribution [14]. 
4.3.1 Borel-Tanner distribution function 
The Borel-Tanner distribution (Tanner-Borel distribution) of Tanner (1953) 
describes the distribution of the total number of customers served before a queue 
vanishes given a single queue with random arrival times of customers (at constant 
rate l) and a constant time (β) occupied in serving each customer. If there are initially 
 customers in the queue, then the probability that the total number ( ) of customers 
served before the queue vanishes is equal to  is calculated from (4.7) [18]: 
 (4.7) 
The case gives Borel distribution; this was obtained by Borel (1942). The 
parameters  and β appear only in the form of their product . It is convenient to use 
a single symbol for this product and to put  [18]. 
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5.  FAILURE PROPAGATION ESTIMATION FOR TURKISH NATIONAL 
POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEM-THRACE REGION 
5.1 Turkish National Power System, Thrace Region 
Turkish electricity transmission system has a total transmission capacity of 95000 
MVA and is operated by Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEİAŞ) [19]. 
Its splitted up into Transmission, Installation&Operation Group devisions. Thrace 
part of Turkey consists of 2 out of 22 devisions; namely, 1
st
 and 21
th
 Transmission, 
Installation&Operation Group devisions in Davutpasa and Edirne, respectively. This 
study covers the regions included in those two regions, since Thrace part was a single 
devision in the past. Thrace part of Turkish National Power Transmission System is 
the most power consuming region of Turkey (30-35%) [19]. In this area, the 
electrical network contains both the 154 kV and 380 kV high voltage levels. The 
transmission network consists of several types of transmision lines (2C, 3C etc) and 
several types of high voltage underground cables (K100, K1600 etc). Table 5.1 
illustrates the number of main components in this sample transmission system. 
Calassification of the components is done according to TEİAŞ data collection 
scheme. 
Table 5. 1: Number of electrical components in Thrace network. 
Component type 
Number of 
components 
380 kV transmission line/cable 22 
154 kV transmission line/cable 111 
Power transformer 109 
Autotransformer 11 
Figure 5.1 shows the geographical lay-out of TEİAŞ-Thrace power transmission 
network. In the figure, red lines and black lines show 154 kV, and 380 kV power 
transmission lines/cables. 
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Figure 5. 1:TEİAŞ-Thrace power transmission system. 
5.2 Data Set 
Past records showed that the number of outages in Thrace part of Turkish National 
Power Transmission system was more than it was expected and more than the 
number of outages at the other parts of the system [19]. The study used 7-year 
duration operational data belonging to 2000-2006 provided by TEİAŞ authority. 
Outage data includes the outage time and repaired time to the nearest minute for each 
outage. In addition, data includes atmospheric conditions, shedded loads, failure 
reasons and failure types for some otages.Sample outage data sheet is shown in 
Figure 5.2  
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Figure 5.2 : Sample outage data-sheet used in the studies. 
Transmission line/cable outages include both the failures occurred along the 
transmission lines/cables and the station oriented failures at both terminals. There 
were totally 4320 outages recorded by TEİAŞ staff over the 7 years [20]. The 
number of total outages for each year is shown in Table 5.2. These data include the 
transmission lines and cables (380 kV and 154 kV), power transformers and 
autotransformers. A detailed single and multiple outage statistics in for the region is 
reported in [19]. 
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Table 5.2 : Number of outages in each year. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
number of 
outages 
654 817 557 645 755 156 736 
5.3 Grouping Outages into Cascades and Stages 
At the first phase of outage propagation study, it is necessary to group the outages 
into different cascades, and then seperate these cascades into different stages. 
Classification is done with respect to outage and repair timings and it is not based on 
the relation between the single outages. 
Outages starting within one hour time period and finishing (taking back into service) 
time differences are not more than 2 hours are accepted to be in the same cascade. 
These time segmentations are arbitrary and it can be shown that it doesn‟t have 
significant impact on the final propagation rates. On the other hand, outages starting 
within the same minute are classified as belonging to the same stage in the cascade. 
It is obvious that such a classification does not include temporary outages which are 
generally fixed within in a minute. 
5.4 Branching Processes 
With assumption of arbitrary distribution of nonzero initial failures ( ) it is a 
standard result in branching processes that the total number of failures Y is 
distributed according to Borel-Tanner distributions. 
5.5 Estimating Cascading Outage  
Borel-Tanner probability mass function was given in (4.7) as, 
 (5.1) 
This function with n=1 will be used to estimate cascading outage as bellow: 
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 (5.2) 
It is obvious that we will have  like shown in (5.3): 
 (5.3) 
In theese functions, total number of failures Y is the sum of s. 
 (5.4) 
is number of failures in i-th stage of the cascade. is the initial outage number 
before cascades start. 
Average propagation rate is shown by λ, sufficient condition for (5.2) is  
. To calculate λ, bellow equation will be used: 
 (5.5) 
Note that λ shows the propagation rate and is different from failure rate. This rate 
shows how outages in any stage propagate to the next stages. 
  in Eq. 5.5 show the number of outages in stage j of cascade k. 
The empirical distribution of Y can also directly be obtained from the utility data by 
using Eq. (5.6). 
 (5.6) 
To test how well the branching process model describes the data, first we use (5.2) 
and calculate λ from (5.5). This calculation shows how the distribution of initial 
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outages used to predict the distribution of the total number of outages Y. Then, λ  
will be calculated empirically using (5.6). Finaly, the two failure propagation rates 
will be compared. The probability of cascade starting with  initial outages is 
calculated from (5.7). 
 (5.7) 
In our study cascades contain transformers, autotransformers, overheadlines, cables. 
According to 7-year outage data, there are totally 524 cascades. Λ, calculated for 
each year is as shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 : λ for each year calculated from utility data. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
λ 0.189 0.163 0.118 0.144 0.147 0.057 0.11 
 
As seen in table 5.3, λ gets the smallest value in 2005 for the study period. There are 
big differences between this minimal propagation rate and the other propagation 
rates. Actually, this case is originated due to minimum number of failures in 2005 
(see Table 5.2). The result can be stated as, less number of annual failures generally 
give low values of propagation rates. 
The average propagation rate for the 7-year period is   
Initial outages distribution using (5.7) is shown in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 : Initial outage distribution. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 0.879 0.081 0.022 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.001 
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Table 5.5(continue) 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 21 
0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
Empirically calculated probabilities of total line outages (  using TEİAŞ utility 
data and (5.6) will give result like table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.6 : Empirical  using TEİAŞ data. 
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 0.827 0.097 0.031 0.014 0.007 0.005 
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 >12 
0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 
As  is getting too small after 12 outages, more than 12 outages is considered in 
cumulative form.  
Using table 5.3 and λ calculated above we will have estimated  by using (5.2). 
Results are shown as in table 5.5. 
Table 5.7: Estimated . 
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 0.762 0.155 0.047 0.017 0.007 0.005 
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 >12 
0.002 0.001 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 
Comparing estimated and empirical (table 5.4 and table 5.5) we have an average 
error of 23.12% for the first 8 stages. 
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Comparing estimated and empirical results for are shown in Figure 5.3 in detail. 
 
Figure 5. 3 : Comparison empirical and estimated . 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
We consider cascading transmission line outages observed in 7 years of operation of 
a  power system explained at 5.1, by describing components bulk statistical behavior 
rather than the details of individual cascades. In this study, the branching process 
calculations bulk all the outages together, in future works it will be better to divide 
outages into different categories, for example initial outages can be sorted into two 
different categories like little or no propagation probability outages and high 
probability of propagation outages. 
 We group the outages into cascades and stages according to their outage times and 
then estimate the average propagation of the outages (λ). For this data, the empirical 
distribution of the total number of outages are well approximated by the initial 
outages propagating according to a branching process with propagation parameter λ. 
In particular, this data supports the validity of the branching process model for 
prediction of the distribution of the total number of outages. As the propagation 
parameter lambda may be highly variable depending upon system loading and 
generation dispatch, the branching method averaged over time and over the area over 
which the data was collected. In this study outages occurring within a certain time 
interval were considered to be dependent outages and the location of the outages has 
no role in considering dependence. 
Hui Ren and Ian Dobson at [15] calculate λ just for lines whereas in this study we do 
same calculation for transformers and autotransformers beside the lines. Average 
propagation of the outages in [15] is equil to 0.25 but in our study is about 0.14 
which means each outage in the network produces an average of λ=0.14 outages in 
the next stage. This result is less than λ calculated at [15] considering in this study 
we calculate this λ considering all network components but in [15] they just calculate 
it for lines. Note that region considered in this study is much smaller than region 
considered at [15]. The probability distribution of total outages in cascades are also 
predicted and it has about 23% error in comparison with empirically results shown in 
table 5.4, this error is calculated for first 8 stages which are more populated. 
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In this study we use branching process to predict the probability distribution of the 
size of cascading outages using industry data, when the initial outage distribution is 
known. Obviously for more accurate results we need data for more years and of 
course data gathered with more detail will help to produce more accurate results. 
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